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Federalism and Preemption in
October Term 1999
Jonathan D. Varat*
Relying on national prerogatives and policies in order to ward off state taxes,
state regulations, and potential state common-law liability, business litigants found
an unusually receptive ear at the Supreme Court this past Term.' A staple of the
Court's ongoing work is management of the balance of federal and state power in
our complex and sophisticated federal structure of government, especially in the
context of regulation of commercial enterprises that often seek to avoid federal or
state control by claiming that whichever level of government seeks to impose such
control lacks authority under the Constitution to do so, because only the other level
possesses the requisite power. This year was no exception, although my
commentary is limited primarily to the validity of state laws challenged as
inconsistent with federal power itself or particular exercises of federal power.
In one case that relied in large part on unexercised federal power to regulate
interstate commerce, Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board,2 the Court
unanimously struck down a California tax provision that the Justices believed
unreasonably limited the interest expense deduction otherwise available to multi-
state corporations properly subject to tax on the proportionate share of their overall
income attributable to California activity.3 The deduction limit was crafted in such
a way that it effectively imposed an impermissible tax on income that the multi-
state corporation earned in other states through unrelated business transactions
that had no connection with California.4 Justice Breyer's opinion applied earlier
cases in accordance with their generous spirit of assuring that no state may tax
income deriving from interstate activity beyond what may properly and propor-
tionately be attributed to the taxing state and the in-state values of the enterprise.5
He concluded that California's failure to allocate interest expense deductions
reasonably "to the income that the expense generates... constitutes impermissible
taxation of income outside its jurisdictional reach" and "therefore violates the Due
Process and Commerce Clauses of the Constitution."6
*. Dean and Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles School of Law.
1. In a parallel development, the tobacco industry also managed to ward off regulation by the federal
Food and Drug Administration, which was held to lack statutory authority from Congress to regulate
tobacco products. Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
2. 528 U.S. 458 (2000).
3. Id. at 460.
4. Id. at 461.
5. Id. at 463-64.
6. Id. at 468.
Protection of our national economic and political union against the disabling
effects of potentially multiple burdens of taxation imposed by different states on
the same interstate activity, and protection against risks of damage to harmony
among the states implicated by state attempts to exercise extraterritorial power in
other states, are policies powerfully embraced by the Court that tend to make it
vigilant about enforcing the constitutional limits on state power imposed by the
commerce clause when those interests seem threatened, even fairly remotely.'
These high national stakes undoubtedly account for both the Court's unanimity
and its care in sorting through the real impact of such often highly technical tax
schemes.
The Court did not strike out in any new direction with the Hunt-Wesson
decision. As important as the principles implemented by it are, the case represents
no departure from precedent and, to understate the matter, no quantum leap in
expanding what had gone before. More grist for the analytic mill and more
instances of common ground, fault lines, and unexplored territory can be found in
the Term's preemption decisions, all of which also went against state power-a fact
that at least invites reflection in the context of a Court that, of late, has been
particularly solicitous of state power and particularly stingy about federal power.
In four cases that asked the Justices to resolve whether certain federal laws,
statutory and administrative, preempted state legislation or the application of state
common law, the Court ruled in favor of preemption in each one, thereby
removing any obligation to comply with the challenged state law and confining the
regulatory compliance obligations of the business challengers to those stemming
from the preemptive federal law.8
The Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution requires that state law
yield to the extent it is inconsistent with valid federal law.9 Assuming Congress
has acted within its constitutional authority-an assumption all the Justices
apparently made in this Term's preemption decisions-the ultimate touchstone in
resolving claims of preemption is whether Congress intended to allow or disallow
the challenged state act. Interpretive judgment is always required, of course, both
to ascertain what Congress intended and whether state law is inconsistent with
what Congress intended. Therein lies the room for many factors-attitude,
predisposition, judicial role definition, policy, and other sorts of potentially lurking
constitutional questions-to enter into the exercise of that interpretive judgment
and, hence, ample room for disagreement.
If the federal legislation contains an explicit provision preempting certain
kinds of state law, or an explicit provision disclaiming preemption of certain kinds
of state law, or both (as sometimes happens), the Court still faces the interpretive
7. Id. at 466.
8. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc.,
529 U.S. 861 (2000); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000); United States v. Locke, 529
U.S. 89 (2000).
9. See U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
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task of defining the category of state laws preempted, saved from preemption, or
both.'" If the federal legislation does not address the preemption question
explicitly, or if it does so only within a limited realm that leaves other areas of
potential preemption unaddressed, the Court goes on to consider whether Congress
nonetheless intended, by implication, to preempt some set of state laws."
Ascertaining what Congress has implied when it has not expressed itself explicitly
tends to be a more difficult task, however, that opens up interesting debates and
disagreements about the proper sources of implication and the applicability of
interpretive presumptions that favor or disfavor preemption in differing contexts.
To borrow and paraphrase an insight from.a famous observation of Oliver
Wendell Holmes about the very different matter of implying conditions in
contracts (fully conscious that the analogy is hardly complete, but believing that
it does have something useful to offer):
You always can imply a [congressional intent to preempt state law]. But
why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as to the practice of the
community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in
short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of
exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding
exact logical conclusions. Such matters really are battle grounds where
the means do not exist for determinations that shall be good for all time,
and where the decision can do no more than embody the preference of a
given body in a given time and place. We do not realize how large a part
of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight change in the habit of
the public mind.'"
In one of its unanimous preemption decisions this Term,' 3 the Court, per
Justice Souter, explicated its current understanding this way:
Even without an express provision for preemption, we have found that a
state law must yield to a congressional Act in at least two circumstances.
When Congress intends to "occupy the field," state law in that area is
preempted .... And even if Congress has not occupied the field, state
law is naturally preempted to the extent of any conflict with a federal
statute .... We will find preemption where it is impossible for a private
10. See generally Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
11. Id.
12. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457,466 (1897).
13. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
party to comply with both state and federal law.., and where "under the
circumstances of [a] particular case, [the challenged state law] stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."... What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of
judgment, to be informed by examining the federal statute as a whole and
identifying its purpose and intended effects: "For when the question is
whether a Federal act overrides a state law, the entire scheme of the
statute must of course be considered and that which needs must be
implied is of no less force than that which is expressed. If the purpose of
the act cannot otherwise be accomplished-if its operation within its
chosen field must be frustrated and its provisions be refused their natural
effect-the state law must yield to the regulation of Congress within the
sphere of its delegated power."' 4
The Court also recognized, as it had done before, that "field preemption"
might be understood as a species of "conflict preemption," which itself consists of
both impossibility-of-compliance conflict and frustration-of-purpose conflict. 5
Together, these guidelines for implying preemptive congressional intent, to which
the Justices unanimously subscribed at least in this instance, represent the current
general framework of preemption analysis. The specific ways in which they are
applied, and the variables that enter into their application, tell us a good deal more
about how readily different members of the Court find or do not find preemptive
intent.
The United States either became a party or participated amicus curiae in all
four of this Term's preemption cases, though the position of the federal govern-
ment and the position of the affected businesses were arrayed against state
authority in only three of them.'6 That simple statement of who was aligned on
which side of each controversy obviously does not tell the whole tale, and would
not even if the cases reflected some united litigating position of the federal
government and the business parties. Rather, the opinions in these cases
highlighted the degree to which the Court's process of discerning congressional
intent is a multi-dimensional process, inevitably requiring aids to interpretation
because legislative text is so often inconclusive and because additional evidence
of the preemptive intent of Congress is ambiguous or severely lacking.
Like the dormant commerce clause decision in Hunt-Wesson, two of the
preemption decisions were also unanimous, although, intriguingly, each found it
14. Id. at 372-73 (internal citations omitted).
15. Id. at 372 n.6.
16. The exception was in Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000), where the
Federal Highway Administration, contrary to an earlier position, now took a stance against preemption of
a state tort law claim by its own regulations-a new and different stance that the Court felt "contradict[ed]
the agency's own previous construction that this Court adopted as authoritative in" CSX Transportation,
Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993). Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 356.
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unnecessary to decide what are likely to be more contentious questions in future
cases. The first, United States v. Locke, addressed regulations adopted by the
State of Washington to prevent oil spills from tankers plying its waters."
Notwithstanding provisions of the intervening Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), "
which explicitly preserved some state authority, Locke reaffirmed the Court's
earlier decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co. 9 and held that the federal Ports
and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA)2 ° preempted state regulations
purporting to establish separate standards for tanker crew training, English
language proficiency, navigation watch, and marine casualty incident reporting.2'
OPA's text and "the established federal-state balance in matters of maritime
commerce" preserved separate state authority in the areas of liability and
compensation for oil spills, but did not enlarge state authority in the area of
design, operation, and staffing of oil tankers that was controlled by the PWSA.22
The second, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council-coming from a state
on the other coast-held that a Massachusetts statute which limited the power of
state agencies to buy goods or services from companies doing business with Burma
was preempted by a subsequently enacted federal statute imposing mandatory and
conditional federal sanctions on Burma." The state law was thought to be
fundamentally at odds with the means Congress had embraced to achieve its
diplomatic objectives-delegating "effective discretion to the President to control
economic sanctions against Burma," limiting "sanctions solely to United States
persons and new investment," and directing "the President to proceed diplomati-
cally in developing a comprehensive, multilateral strategy towards Burma."'
Although the states fared no better in the other two preemption cases, the
federal-state conflicts were quite different in character, and the Justices were more
divided. Both involved federal preemption of state tort law causes of action, rather
than state statutes. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, a state common law
wrongful death tort action brought by the widow of a man driving a truck who was
struck and killed by a train at a grade crossing, was premised on the alleged failure
of the railroad to maintain adequate warning devices." A seven-Justice majority
17. 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
18. Oil Pollution Act (OPA) of 1990,33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-61 (2001).
19. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
20. Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-32(a) (2001).
21. Locke, 529 U.S. at 116. The Court also remanded for the district court or circuit court to determine
whether or not some state regulations, such as a watch requirement in times of restricted visibility, were
preempted or not under the guidelines the Court adopted. Id.
22. Id. at 106.
23. 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000).
24. Id. at 373-74.
25. 529 U.S. 344, 347 (2000).
of the Supreme Court found the tort claim preempted by the Federal Railroad
Safety Act of 1970,26 as implemented through the Federal Highway Administra-
tion's regulation governing warning devices at railroad grade crossings installed
using federal funds, because the signs at the crossing where the accident occurred
fully complied with federal standards at the time of the accident.27
The most closely divided preemption case of the Term, Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., Inc.,28 similarly held a state common law tort action to recover
for injuries sustained in an auto accident, this time based on a car manufacturer's
failure to provide an airbag, preempted by the 1984 version of a Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard29 adopted by the federal Department of Transportation
pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.' Justice
Breyer's majority opinion first determined that the Act's express preemption
provision did not explicitly preempt the lawsuit.3 He then concluded, on the other
hand, that another section of the Act-providing that compliance with a federal
safety standard "does not exempt any person from any liability under common
law"-did not go so far as to preserve all state-law tort actions, including those that
conflict with federal standards.32 Finally, addressing "whether a common-law 'no
airbag' action.., actually conflicts with" the federal standard,33 the majority held
that, unlike a rigid rule of state tort law imposing a duty to install an airbag on the
decedent's 1987 Honda Accord, the federal standard deliberately allowed
manufacturers a choice among different passive restraint mechanisms and
deliberately sought a gradual phasing in of passive restraints, so that the tort
claim, if allowed, would have obstructed the "means-related federal objectives."'
These four preemption decisions represent well the current status of
preemption doctrine and the many dimensions that come into play when the Court
is asked to decide whether and where federal authority has left room for state
policy influence. In none of these cases was any question raised about the power
of Congress to preempt the challenged state law-only about whether Congress had
in fact exercised a conceded power to preempt. Within that context, a number of
instructive propositions or premises seem to underlie these decisions. Some
questions about their implications for the fabric of federal-state relations more
generally yearn for articulation, and a variety of unresolved issues, both about
preemption and about other related constitutional matters, invite speculation about
future developments in this branch of federalism jurisprudence.
26. Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) of 1970,49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-53 (2001).
27. Id.
28. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
29. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208,49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2001).
30. Id. at 862-68. See National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-69
(2001).
31. Geier, 529 U.S. at 868.
32. Id. at 868-69.
33. Id. at 874.
34. Id. at 881-82.
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THE USE OF DEFAULT RULES IN DEFINING AND APPLYING PREEMPTION
DOCTRINE: OF HISTORY AND TRADITION, FEDERALISM, AND THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Understandings of what matters traditionally or historically have fallen within
the ambit of state or federal power appear to play an influential, but not
determinative, role in sorting out the proper respective spheres of federal and state
authority. In the contentious arena of federalism-based constitutional limitations
recently imposed by the Court on Congress' power to regulate non-commercial
local activity that nonetheless affects interstate commerce, the majority has placed
some reliance on the fact that Congress seeks to regulate subjects that traditionally
or historically have been the province of state law. 5 In the preemption context,
when it is admitted that Congress has constitutional power to regulate, preemption
issues are more likely to be resolved in favor of federal displacement of state law
when the subject matter historically has been of federal concern, and more likely
to be resolved in favor of finding room for state law that is not directly in conflict
with federal law, narrowly construed, when the subject matter historically has been
of state concern. An interesting question is whether, in some circumstances at
least, this Term's decisions may suggest a weakening of the nonpreemption
assumption (in the interest of less regulation of business generally). Thus, in
Locke, 6 the Washington oil spill regulation case, Justice Kennedy's opinion
reasoned that the classic "assumption" of nonpreemption set forth in Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp. 37-that when Congress has legislated "in a field which the States
have traditionally occupied[,] we start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress"-is "not triggered when the State
regulates in an area where there has been a history of significant federal
presence."3 Thus, because Congress has regulated national and international
maritime commerce from the earliest days of the Republic, there was "no
35. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that Congress lacks constitutional
power under the Commerce Clause to make gun possession in local school zones a federal crime); United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that Congress may not federalize gender-motivated crimes
of violence under either its power to regulate interstate commerce or its power to enforce the equality
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment).
36. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
37. 331 U.S. 218, 230(1947).
38. Locke, 529 U.S. at 90.
beginning assumption that concurrent regulation by the States is a valid exercise
of its police powers."39
One might have predicted that the Court in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council also would have put aside the assumption of nonpreemption-and perhaps
even have embraced an assumption favoring preemption-when it evaluated the
validity of Massachusetts' Burma sanctions law, which sought to influence the
human rights behavior of a foreign government and thus touched on a subject of
prime federal concern-foreign relations.' Whether in practice the unanimity of
the Justices reflects such an approach or not, Justice Souter's opinion for the Court
left "for another day a consideration in this context of a presumption against
preemption[,]" because even if such a presumption were appropriate, the state Act
"presents a sufficient obstacle to the full accomplishment of Congress's objectives
under the federal Act to find it preempted."'" Finding the state sanctions law in
conflict with the purposes of the federal sanctions law also obviated the need for
the Court "to speak to field preemption as a separate issue" or to address "the
foreign affairs power or the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause"-matters that may
be of future import.42
Both preemption decisions prohibiting the application of state tort law
potentially bumped up against the presumption of nonpreemption because tort
regimes are traditionally, and overwhelmingly, the subject of state law. In Norfolk
Southern Railway Co. v. Shanklin, however, no mention was made of the
presumption, even though Justice Ginsburg in dissent, joined by Justice Stevens,
would have allowed the state tort claim to proceed.43 Rather, the fight in that case
focused on whether general approval by the Federal Highway Administration of
a state project to install warning devices at railroad crossings using federal funds
automatically and completely displaced state law evaluations of the adequacy of
the warning devices with federal measures of adequacy, or only established
minimum federal standards of adequacy, which state law was free to supplement
under the terms of the federal agency regulations." The language of the
regulations, the statements of the Court in its earlier Easterwood decision,45 and
the effect of the agency's decision to change from supporting to opposing
39. Id. at 108.
40. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-86 (2000).
4 I. Id. at 374 n.8. Perhaps Justice Souter, who tends to be a strong adherent of the presumption against
preemption, see, e.g., Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Assn., 505 U.S. 88, 114-22 (1992) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that, in the absence of any clear expression of Congressional intent to preempt, state
acts were not preempted where compliance with federal law does not render obedience to state law
impossible), did not want to cast any doubt at all on the presumption, or its applicability in different
contexts, unless doing so-even in a limited context-would be absolutely necessary.
42. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374 n.8.
43. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 360-61 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 347-49.
45. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993).
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preemption of such tort claims were the principal articulated dividing elements
between majority and dissent-not any presumption against preemption.4
The five-to-four decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., on the other
hand, revealed the Court to be divided sharply on the applicability of the
presumption of nonpreemption and its effect on interpretation of both the express
preemption provision and the express saving-from-preemption provision, as well
as on the assessment of whether a state no-airbag tort claim conflicted with the
objectives of the federal DOT's Safety Standard.47 The dissent by Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, found the majority's decision to
be an "unprecedented extension of the doctrine of pre-emption,"" in derogation
of state sovereign authority in an area historically within state police power, by
allowing federal judges to limit the application of state tort law based, not on the
intent of Congress or the text of administrative regulations adopted pursuant to
congressional authorization, but on federal judge-made rules stemming from
federal agency commentary and the history of agency regulation.49
These dissenters perceived no threat to the objectives of the federal Safety
Standard from the state tort suit, because they did not find the Safety Standard's
approaches of gradualism and acceptance of flexibility among alternative passive
restraint systems of independent importance to the agency, apart from the
Standard's overall objective of reducing injury and death to vehicle occupants,
with which they believed a tort law airbag requirement would have been
consistent.' They would have construed the Act and its express saving provision
to impose a "special burden on a party relying on an arguable implicit conflict
with a temporary regulatory policy-rather than a conflict with congressional policy
or with the text of any regulation-to demonstrate that a common-law claim has
been pre-empted.'' They thought "the presumption against preemption should
control" because it is "rooted in the concept of federalism" and has several "signal
virtues": 2 (1) it leaves it to Congress, which is better suited than the Judiciary, to
strike the appropriate state/federal balance; (2) it makes Congress accountable
when striking the balance by requiring it to speak clearly and thereby give the
States adequate notice and appropriate political opportunity to defend state
interests in the national political process; (3) it "prevents federal judges from
46. See Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 352-61.
47. Geierv. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
208,49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2001).
48. Geier, 529 U.S. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. id. at 887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 892-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 898-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 906 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
running amok with our potentially boundless (and perhaps inadequately
considered) doctrine of implied conflict preemption based on frustration of
purposes";53 and (4) it is even more important to apply to administrative agencies,
which are not designed to represent the interests of states in the way that Congress
is, and thus should be required to be specific about any intent to preempt state law
through the formal notice-and-comment rule-making process, so that States again
will have an adequate opportunity to participate in the presentation of state
interests before a preemption decision displacing historic state authority is made.'
Given the presumption against preemption, and the absence of any indication of
an intent to preempt the state tort claim in the text of either the federal statute or
the federal regulation, the dissenters disagreed "with the Court's unprecedented
use of inferences from regulatory history and commentary as a basis for implied
pre-emption.""
For.its part, the majority rejected any notion "that the pre-emption provision,
the saving provision, or both together, create some kind of'special burden' beyond
that inherent in ordinary preemption principles [that] would specially disfavor pre-
emption here."56 The text of the provisions did not support that result, wrote
Justice Breyer, and adopting a special burden disfavoring preemption for cases
involving frustration-of-purpose conflict preemption would create unnecessary
practical difficulties and new complexities, requiring a new distinction between
impossibility-of-compliance conflict cases and frustration-of-purpose conflict cases
that is unwarranted, given that both were forms of implied preemption. 7 Justice
Breyer thought that the special burden requirement and the requirement of a
formal agency statement of preemptive intent, both urged by the dissent as
prerequisites for finding an implied conflict, reflected the dissent's general doubts
about the wisdom of the doctrine of frustration-of-purpose conflict preemption,
which the majority did not share. 8 Although the majority ultimately found the
Safety Standard's language and the contemporaneous agency explanation of it
clear enough to demonstrate that the tort claim would obstruct the Standard's
objective of "gradually developing [a] mix of alternative passive restraint devices
for safety-related reason s""-with no indication that the majority had discarded the
presumption against nonpreemption in the process-Justice Breyer also defended
the majority's placing some weight on the agency's view that the tort suit in
53. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 908 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 912-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 871.
57. Id. at 870-74.
58. Id. at 872.
59. Id. at 886.
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question would frustrate'the Standard's objectives, at least given the agency's
expertise and the consistency of that view over time.'
How deep the fault lines in the Geier decision go is as yet unclear, but the
opinions do seem to reveal divides within the Court about (a) the strength of
adherence to the presumption against preemption in areas historically the province
of the states; (b) as a corollary-and of potentially major importance-the strength
of adherence to the doctrine of frustration-of-purpose conflict preemption; (c) the
degree of willingness to rely on federal agency views of the preemptive intent of
its own regulations; and (d) the level of transparency of agency process upon
which the Court will insist in order to enable the states to have their say in
preventing preemption before it happens.
VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT OF THE
FEDERAL-STATE BALANCE: OF DUAL AND SINGLE REGULATION AND
DIFFERENT ALIGNMENTS OF JUSTICES IN PREEMPTION CHALLENGES
THAN IN CHALLENGES TO THE SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
When a case presents a question of the primacy of state or federal power, there
is more to predicting the stance of individual members of the Court than asking
about each what his or her general predisposition is towards the salience of the
general roles of state and nation in our federalist structure. Not only is context
important, but so are cross-cutting predispositions, such as-to take just
one-whether more or less regulation of business and other private conduct by
whatever level of government seeks to impose the regulation is perceived to be
desirable. Because federal preemption of state law eliminates one source of
regulation, just as rulings that Congress or the states lack constitutional power to
regulate a particular field or subject do, those Justices inclined to curtail
congressional power under the Constitution may not be inclined, when
congressional power is clear, to interpret the preemptive intent of Congress
narrowly in favor of preserving concurrent, or dual, state regulation. Last Term's
preemption and related decisions suggest a number of alternative, combined
approaches that undercut the accuracy of any simplistic dichotomy between state-
power and federal-power orientations.
Specifically, the views of each Justice on two separate questions-the proper
scope of national power under the Constitution and the relative importance of the
presumption against preemption when that power is exercised-reveal some
60. Id. at 882-83. As noted earlier, by contrast, the Court declined to defer to federal agency views of
preemption in Shanklin, where the agency's views of preemption had changed over time.
interesting alliances and some instructive possibilities about strategies employed
in addressing the federal/state balance. This assessment also may clarify why the
preemption decisions appear to exhibit a greater willingness to find federal
preemption of state law than one might expect of this Court. Most illuminating
is a comparison of the five-to-four split in the Geier v. American Honda Motor
Co., Inc.6" preemption case with the different five-to-four split in the United States
v. Morrison62 and United States v. Lopez63 decisions, holding that Congress is
without constitutional power to make gender-motivated violence or local gun
possession federal crimes, respectively.' 4
Four interesting groupings emerge from this comparison. Only one
Justice-Justice Breyer-favors both maximum constitutional power in Congress and
maximum readings of federal preemptive intent when that power is exercised. At
least in this respect, he might be described as the most nationalist of the Justices.
Four Justices-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Scalia-favor restricting the constitutional power of Congress, but seem inclined
to find federal preemptive intent readily. To some this may seem inconsistent with
a general disposition of these Justices to favor state authority. In the preemption
cases, however, it is not a case of federal or state regulation, but whether there will
be state regulation in addition to federal regulation. Under those circumstances,
what might be at work are both a general disposition to curtail federal authority
and a general disposition to favor deregulation of the private sector, even if the
deregulation disposition comes at the expense of state regulatory power.
Only one Justice-Justice Thomas-appears to favor both restricting
congressional power under the Constitution and limiting the preemptive effects of
federal law on residual state power. At least in these respects, he might be
described as the most consistently state-power-oriented member of the Court.
The three remaining Justices-Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg-define
a fourth combination that favors maximum congressional power, but also a
presumption that it has not been exercised to limit state power unless Congress
makes such intent very clear. This group appears to favor a combination of
flexibility and political accountability for congressional acts that would deprive the
states of regulatory power. To put it another way, these Justices seem to subscribe
to a strategy of managing the federal/state balance that gives Congress the power
to nationalize policy uniformly, if it believes that is appropriate, but assumes that,
in cases of any doubt, Congress does not want to do so, because it would thereby
limit state variation and experimentation.
On a related and at least partially confirming note, the Court unanimously
decided in Jones v. United States,65 on the same day that it issued its opinion in
61. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
62. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
63. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
64. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
65. 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
[Vol. 28: 757, 2001] Federalism and Preemption
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Geier,' that as a matter of statutory interpretation, the federal arson statute, which
applies to "any. . . property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any
activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce[J" does not cover arson of an
owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial purpose.67 Justice
Ginsburg's majority opinion engaged in standard textual interpretation, but also
drew support from the proposition that federal statutes should be interpreted to
avoid raising constitutional questions-in this case, whether extending the federal
arson statute to cover arson of non-commercial dwellings would exceed Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce in light of Lopez." Moreover, since "arson
is a paradigmatic common-law state crime[,]" it was appropriate to invoke the
more general proposition that "'unless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will
not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance' in the
prosecution of crimes. '
Justice Stevens concurred, joined by Justice Thomas, "to emphasize the
kinship between our well-established presumption against federal preemption of
state law, and our reluctance to 'believe Congress intended to authorize federal
intervention in local law enforcement in a marginal case such as this.""'7 Of
course, the "kinship" is hardly that of identical twins. The preemption issue asks
whether state law is to be displaced by federal, whereas the issue of whether the
federal statute covers the local crime asks whether there will be federal jurisdiction
in addition to any state criminal jurisdiction. For the group of Justices disposed
to limit federal authority except when finding preemption will limit state
regulation with no enlargement of federal regulation, embracing a narrow
interpretation of federal authority that has no effect on state authority should be
attractive. In that sense, although there may be a kinship along the lines that
Justice Stevens articulated for the group of Justices who favor the presumption of
nonpreemption, there is little kinship between the preemption question and the
scope of coverage question for the other group, whose common objective might
well be to limit dual regulation by finding preemption more readily to cut down
on state regulation and by interpreting the scope of federal coverage narrowly to
cut down on federal regulation when preemption is not at stake. Starting with
separate, somewhat opposing premises, therefore, these eight Justices are likely to
join in cases like Jones. A general reluctance to assume the harshness of "making
a federal crime out of it" only adds to the mix and could well bring Justice Breyer
66. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
67. Jones, 529 U.S. at 850 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)).
68. Id. at 858.
69. Id. (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
70. Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Altobella, 442 F.2d 310,316 (7thCir.
197 1)) (internal citation omitted).
into the fold. It may even be that general resistance to federalization of previously
local crimes is widely felt among the Justices in a way that is not as true of
federalizing common law civil claims; but one perhaps should not entirely ignore
the different starting points the Justices have before they come together in cases
like Jones.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PREEMPTION AND (NON-REGULATORY) STATE FISCAL
AUTONOMY
Perhaps the most interesting question left open among this series of cases is
the tension between federal foreign affairs authority and state desires to withhold
from disapproved foreign regimes financial support emanating from state coffers.
Are there subterranean fault lines lying beneath the surface of unanimity in
Crosby that may fragment the common, and seemingly-solid, ground on which the
Justices stood when the permissibility of other state and local sanctions laws aimed
at expressing disapproval of the behavior of foreign governments are brought
before the Court again, as they almost surely will be? If so, of what sort and
severity? By relying on preemption-the inconsistency of the Massachusetts
sanctions statute with the federal sanctions statute-and by declining to address
whether the state law was inconsistent with the mere existence of either the
nation's foreign affairs power or its power to regulate foreign commerce, the Court
left open not only the possibility that different state sanctions laws might survive
constitutional challenge on any of these bases, but also whether variations in
federal sanctions legislation might create more room for state and local sanctions
laws to operate.
Had the Court struck down the Massachusetts law as unconstitutional without
relying on federal legislation, it is likely-though not certain, depending on the
basis and strength of the foreign affairs or foreign commerce clause ruling, as well
as on how active Congress chooses to be in preempting local sanctions law-that
fewer, if any, local sanctions laws aimed at other foreign governments (or even
Myanmar, if Congress modifies its current legislation) could have survived than
will be able to survive preemption challenges under relevant federal statutes that
may vary from the federal statute applied in Crosby. As it turned out, basing
Crosby on preemption leaves a multitude of questions unanswered-undoubtedly
one of the objectives the Justices had in mind. Yet there are some propositions
and statements set forth in the opinion that. suggest at least doctrinal trouble.
The Court remarked in a footnote that the "State concedes, as it must, that in
addressing the subject of the federal Act, Congress has the power to preempt the
state statute."'" This statement apears to assume that there is no constitutional
claim on the part of the state to resist federal interference with this particular
71. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.7 (2000) (emphasis added).
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exercise of the state's spending power. Did the Court commit itself to an even
broader position? Here is what it immediately went on to say in the same footnote:
We add that we have already rejected the argument that a State's
"statutory scheme.., escapes pre-emption because it is an exercise of the
State's spending power rather than its regulatory power." In Gould, we
found that a Wisconsin statute debarring repeat violators of the National
Labor Relations Act... from contracting with the State was preempted
because the state statute's additional enforcement mechanism conflicted
with the federal Act.... The fact that the State "ha[d] chosen to use its
spending power rather than its police power" did not reduce the potential
for conflict with the federal statute.72
Did the Court intend that no exercise of state spending power at odds with
otherwise valid federal legislation can claim constitutional immunity from federal
control, or only that no exercise of state "spending" power that is effectively an
exercise of state "regulatory" power can claim such immunity?
In Gould, the Court said that it agreed with a lower court that "by flatly
prohibiting state purchases from repeat labor law violators Wisconsin 'simply is
not functioning as a private purchaser of services,' ... ; for all practical purposes,
Wisconsin's debarment scheme is tantamount to regulation."73 In Crosby, the
Court neither cited that conclusion nor indicated whether it believed the state
sanctions law also was "tantamount to regulation." Recall, however, that the
Massachusetts statute generally limits state procurement from companies doing
business with Burma.74 Because of the financial pressure imposed on those
companies as an instrument of imposing pressure on a foreign government, it is
certainly arguable that Massachusetts sought to "regulate" those companies rather
than just to choose not to provide financial support to the foreign government. As
for Gould, which involved a ban on direct state purchasing from the repeat NLRA
violators, there was little explanation of exactly why the Court concluded that the
ban was tantamount to regulation, but the Court did describe the state scheme as
a "supplemental sanction for violations of the NLRA," and a "punitive' 76 one at
that, suggesting perhaps that what made it regulatory was its purpose and effect
72. Id. (internal citation omitted).
73. Wis. Dep't of Indus. Labor and Human Rel. v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282, 289 (1986).
74. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 366-67.
75. Gould, 475 U.S. at 288.
76. Id. at 288 n.5.
of enforcing the federal regulatory regime, rather than a more independent
spending decision.
Might exercises of state spending power that are not arguably regulatory still
claim constitutional immunity from federal regulation as an instance of sovereign
fiscal autonomy regarding how to spend state revenues? State and local sanctions
laws that directly withdraw or initially refuse to make financial investments in a
foreign nation without interrupting relationships between intermediaries and that
foreign nation might be understood not as regulatory but as "proprietary," in
which case they might have a stronger claim to fiscal constitutional immunity,
even from attempts by Congress to preempt them.
Although the motive for divestment is political in the ideological sense, and
thus different than simply selling stock or withdrawing financial support for purely
economic reasons, a state's claim to fiscal autonomy in choosing not to invest state
tax revenues outside its jurisdiction or beyond its own residents often has been
upheld under the "market participant" exception to the limits imposed under the
dormant interstate commerce clause.77 The Court has not yet decided, and that is
still true after Crosby, whether the "market participant" exception is available to
states at all under the dormantforeign commerce clause, although as part of the
Court's general view that "state restrictions burdening foreign commerce are
subjected to a more rigorous and searching scrutiny" than state restrictions
burdening interstate commerce are,78 the Court has seemed to suggest that at least
it would be likely to restrict any "market participant" exception it might recognize
under the foreign commerce clause more narrowly than that it is prepared to
permit under the interstate commerce clause.79 But there still is a choice to be
made between a narrow exception and no exception-and that has significant
implications for the validity of the kind of state and local sanctions policies that
involve direct investment or divestment decisions.
It could be, of course, that any exercise of state spending power whose
purpose is not simply to serve the residents of the state using their tax revenues,
but to influence the political behavior of other governments-foreign or even
domestic-might be considered an exercise of regulatory power, regardless of
whether the influence is exercised through direct spending decisions or spending
that involves third parties exerting pressure. Or it could be that an exercise of
state spending power of whatever sort that targets particular foreign countries (or
particular sister states) for pressure might be deemed more regulatory or otherwise
intolerable than those that categorically disadvantage foreign countries as a group
(Buy-American or Buy-in-state statutes). Or it could be that lines might be drawn
between those state spending policies whose purpose is to influence foreign
behavior but are likely to have little practical impact in doing so and similar
77. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUrIONAL LAW 1088-95 (3d Ed. 2000).
78. S. Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 100 (1984).
79. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,437 n.9 (1980).
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spending policies that threaten to have substantial practical impact. Moreover, it
is even possible that the level of complaints from allies and global organizations,
much less our own State Department, about local sanctions policies (which seemed
to play an important role in the decision in Crosby) might figure into the Court's
calculus of permissibility of even the most direct exercises of state spending power.
Still, I continue to believe that states and localities should have some
constitutional freedom to decline to use their own (not federal) revenues to make
a statement in support of human rights, even abroad, so long as they do not sweep
unwilling partners into their efforts.' 0 It remains difficult to accept the notion that
Congress might mandate that state funds be invested in foreign regimes whose
policies the States oppose, even if the federal taxes raised from the same taxpayers
are so used; or that Congress might, "in order to stimulate foreign trade, demand
that states provide subsidies to local businesses that trade with other nations""S; or
that Congress could forbid the States from using state tax revenues to criticize the
behavior of foreign regimes, such as by paying for billboards decrying the human
rights record of Myanmar. 2
All this is to say that, although the fiscal autonomy of the states and their
subdivisions may be severely limited in the interest (admittedly powerful) of
having our foreign policy effectively be conducted by national representatives who
can speak with one voice, that autonomy ought to be recognized as having some
claim of constitutional stature-even against broad federal attempts to preempt
every state spending decision that is motivated by objection to the policies of
particular foreign governments. Ranking high among the affirmative reasons to
work to preserve some residuum of state fiscal self-determination are the value of
capturing the benefits of federalism's creative tension between a multiplicity of
state perspectives and the strong, uniform voice of the national government in
80. Jonathan D. Varat, State Actions on Divestiture Will Survive, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1986, § B,
at 5, col. I (addressing whether federal legislation would, or could, preempt local sanctions against South
African Apartheid).
81. Id.
82. One can imagine arguments that these forms of state fiscal autonomy might be preserved without
adopting a more general limitation on federal authority. For example, at least in theory, one could
distinguish (although in practice it might be hard to define and enforce the distinction on a principled basis)
between Congress compelling affirmative investment of state funds for the benefit of foreign regimes or
trade, on the one hand, and directing states not to disinvest in foreign regimes or trade as a targeted means
of registering displeasure, on the other. An argument that preserved state power to use state funds to pay
for messages criticizing foreign governments might also be made based on guarantees of freedom of speech,
without necessitating reliance on any constitutional recognition of state fiscal autonomy. The former
argument would narrow considerably, but not eliminate, the ability of a state to deploy its spending
authority in an attempt to influence the actions of foreign governments-an ability that would be eliminated
if the Court ultimately were to rule that the very attempt to exert such influence, regardless of the means
employed, exceeded state power or the terms of federal legislation interpreted expansively.
foreign affairs, and the exercise of domestic, tension-releasing local democratic
self-governance it would permit. In any event, at least before finding such state
laws preempted, the Court ought to insist on higher levels of absolute clarity of
congressional intent to preempt than it otherwise might seek, the more invasive
of state fiscal autonomy preemption would be." Absent federal action, moreover,
and all else being equal, the more direct and strictly limited an exercise of state
spending power is and the more it represents a democratically chosen communal
spending policy, the less it should be held restricted by the dormant interstate or
foreign commerce clause.
Later in his opinion in Crosby, Justice Souter wrote the following in support
of the conclusion that the Massachusetts law conflicted "with the President's
intended authority to speak for the United States among the world's nations in
developing a 'comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and
improve human rights practices and the quality of life in Burma.' § 570(c)": 4
It is not merely that the differences between the state and federal Acts in
scope and type of sanctions threaten to complicate discussions; they
compromise the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation
with one voice in dealing with other governments. We need not get into
any general consideration of limits of state action affecting foreign affairs
to realize that the President's maximum power to persuade rests on his
capacity to bargain for the benefits of access to the entire national
economy without exception for enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by
inconsistent political tactics. 5
The strength and scope of these statements might suggest that the Court was
foreshadowing adoption of a firm position that very little, if any, state law at odds
with federal foreign policy decisions will be tolerated, despite the disclaimer that
the Court was not addressing "any general consideration of limits of state action
affecting foreign affairs."86 Even the most minor of state sanctions irritants in
conducting foreign policy negotiations might be expected to fall if national foreign
policy officials must be able at all times to have as bargaining chips "access to the
entire national economy without exception" even for state expenditures, and if
there is absolutely no room for "inconsistent political tactics."87
Yet it would probably be a mistake to read too much into the tone of this
passage. The statements and the tone were not adopted in the absence of federal
legislation, but only in the context of preemption by a federal law in which
83. Varat, supra note 80
84. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
85. Id. at 366-67.
86. Id. at 366.
87. Id. at 366-67.
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Congress sought to direct the President's foreign policy initiatives in a fashion that
gave him extended flexibility and authority. Absent such legislation, absent such
clear legislation, or absent such expressly authorizing legislation, the Court still
might be willing to follow a more tolerant approach to state sanctions laws aimed
at the human rights or other objectionable policies of foreign governments.
The observation about the President's need to be able to bargain for the
benefits of access to the entire national economy without exception if he is to
possess "maximum power to persuade" does not go so far as to say that the
Constitution-or perhaps even the statute-demands that he have that "maximum
power," however desirable that might be. Were the Court to hold, as a result of
federal statutes, and even more dramatically in their absence, that the states could
not interfere with the President's maximum ability to negotiate with foreign
governments entirely unhindered by state and local actions that deviated at all
from his approach, there might be an end to the use of state fiscal autonomy to
withdraw support from unpopular foreign governments. Unless any state purpose
to influence conduct of a foreign government was thought to be enough to
invalidate a state sanctions law, regardless of the mode of influence employed, and
regardless of how little impact that influence might have, there should remain
some room for at least direct investment or divestment sanctions policies to
operate.
What if, however, a state divestment policy were to have such a potentially
large impact that the President's efforts to deal with the foreign regime through
other forms of influence and negotiation were undermined? State employee
retirement funds, such as those in California, are of such sizable amounts that
millions, perhaps billions of dollars could become unavailable to a foreign
government by virtue of state, rather than federal decisions, if left unchecked. 8
Whatever the form of the exercise of sovereign state spending authority, perhaps
any constitutional immunity it might otherwise possess needs to be tempered to
permit Congress to assure that it not severely undermine federal foreign policy
positions and initiatives. Again, however, that is not the same as entirely
removing any fiscal policy discretion from the states in this sphere. Nor does it
answer the question whether the states would retain their authority in the absence
of federal legislation, leaving the burden of acting to curtail undue state impacts
on foreign affairs to congressional, not judicial, oversight.
88. See Jock O'Connell, Is California Seeking to Fashion Its Own Foreign Policy?, L.A. TIMES,
August 20, 2000, § M, at 6 (noting how the possibility of implementing California State Treasurer Phil
Angelides' guidelines poses a "novel challenge to the federal government's Constitutional prerogatives in
foreign relations").
Crosby's unanimity came in the context of federal legislation that was
explicit, detailed, and fortifying of presidential authority. Suppose a number of
possible variations, however. There might be less clear inconsistency between
congressional objectives and state methods in the allegedly preempting legislation.
There might be ambiguity in the text and mixed evidence in the legislative history
of the federal legislation about Congress's preemptive intent.89 There might be a
claim of preemption where Congress is silent or where it bolsters and directs
presidential authority less strongly and clearly, but where the President through
the State Department has issued allegedly preempting regulations pursuant to
more generalized congressional authorizing statutes or pursuant to claims of
inherent executive authority in the realm of foreign affairs. There might be silence
on the part of both Congress and the President until the President argued in favor
of limits on state sanctions policy in the course of litigation, or not even then.
Crosby does not speak directly to these variations and does not provide many clues
about how the Court might approach therh, but it does offer a couple of
propositions that might be relevant to some of them.
First, Justice Souter placed some reliance on protests against the
Massachusetts law by allies and trading partners of the United States and on the
consistent representations of the Executive Branch "that the state Act has
complicated its dealings with foreign sovereigns and proven an impediment to
accomplishing objectives assigned it by Congress."'  Disclaiming unquestioning
deference to the legal judgment of the Executive regarding preemption, the Court
nonetheless found these sources "competent and direct evidence of the frustration
of congressional objectives by the state Act"'" and distinguished another
precedent92 where it had "found the reactions of foreign powers and the opinions
of the Executive irrelevant in fathoming congressional intent because Congress
had taken specific actions rejecting the positions" of both.93 Absent affirmative
evidence of contradictory congressional views on preeemption, therefore, the Court
does seem prepared to pay attention to consistently maintained views of the
Executive Branch and supporting statements of foreign governmental entities in
the global economy leaning in the direction of preemptive intent.
89. Although the Court was unanimous in its conclusion in Crosby, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice
Thomas, concurred only in the judgment because of objections to the majority's extended references to the
statements of the federal statute's sponsors and other excerpts from legislative history, all of which supported
the Court's interpretation of the statute's text. Justice Scalia found those references unnecessary, because
the Court's conclusions were "perfectly obvious on the face of the statute" or "from the record." Crosby
v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. at 371-72 (Scalia, J., concurring). In circumstances where those
conclusions were not perfectly obvious from statutory text, reliance on inferences that might be drawn from
legislative history might well be a contested point in general and, among those who would look to legislative
history, might be found to be of uncertain import in any event.
90. Id. at 368.
91. ld.at369.
92. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 327-29 (1994).
93. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 369.
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Second, the Court rejected the State's argument that the repeated failure of
Congress explicitly to preempt state and local sanctions laws justified a conclusion
of nonpreemption, especially since "various authorities[,]"' including the
Maryland Court of Appeals in a noteworthy case that the Supreme Court did not
review," thought many such measures directed at South Africa more than a decade
ago were not preempted. Finding the silence of Congress in this respect
ambiguous, Justice Souter commented that "[s]ince we never ruled on whether
state and local sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s were preempted or
otherwise invalid, arguable parallels between the two sets of federal and state Acts
do not tell us much about the validity of the latter."' This passage at least suggests
that the Court was not reaching out to rule against state sanctions laws in contexts
where the peculiarities of the state law and the peculiarities of the allegedly
preempting federal law differed from those evaluated for consistency in Crosby.
The Court's noncommittal stance on the validity of state and local sanctions
against South Africa during the apartheid era merely emphasizes the range of
future possibilities the Court has not yet foreclosed. It would be prudent to be
aware of the many variables that may enter into the resolution of future conflicts
between state laws sanctioning foreign governments and the many possible
alignments of views of Congress, the President, and foreign governmental entities
on their validity.
CONCLUSION
In the interstices of preemption doctrine and decisions applying it lie issues
of great moment regarding the proper balance of federal and state power and how
best to interpret and accommodate the respective views of Congress and the
Executive Branch. Preemption is, in a sense, a microcosm of federalism and
separation of powers debates, implicating attitudes about default rules that must
choose between favoring federal or state authority, judicial, congressional, or
administrative dominance in managing the proper federal-state balance, and dual
or single regulation. Last Term's preemption decisions contain elements of all of
these in kaleidoscopic nuance.
94. Id. at 370.
95. Bd. of Trustees v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 744-49 (Md. Ct. App.
1989), cert. denied subnom., Lubman v. Mayor and City Council of Bait., 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
96. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 370.

PROFESSOR ERWIN CHEMERINSKY'S RESPONSE
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: It's been an amazing day, but it's been a really
long day too, so I'll try to be brief. Dean Varat has done an excellent job of
illuminating relationships between the Supreme Court decisions limiting
federal power and those dealing with preemption. I want to make three points
about that relationship. First, the Supreme Court's preemption decisions are
inconsistent with a desire to protect state sovereignty and state choice. One
would think that a Court that's concerned about protecting state prerogatives
would want a very narrow preemption doctrine. After all, one way to free up
state choice would be limit the preemptive effect of federal laws. That's not
at all what the Supreme Court has done with regard to preemption, as Dean
Varat's description just showed us.
Let me focus on two of the cases he talked about. The first was Geier v.
America Honda Motor Co., Inc.' Alexis Geier bought an 1987 model Honda
Accord. She got in an auto accident. The car crashed into a tree, and she was
seriously injuied. She sued Honda for negligence and for products liability
under state tort law. Well, it turns out the 1987 model Honda Accord was
made under 1987 safety standards promulgated by the Department of
Transportation. Those safety standards required that all cars have passive
restraint systems, and they gave automobile manufacturers three choices as
to what to install. One was air bags, and in fact Geier's claim was had her car
had air bags, she wouldn't have been so seriously injured. A second option
that car manufacturers had was lap and shoulder belts. That's what her car
had. So Honda argued that her state-tort law claim was preempted because
it had complied with the federal safety standards.
However, the 1987 Department of Transportation safety standards were
promulgated under authority passed by Congress in a 1986 statute. That
statute had an Express Savings Clause. That clause said that nothing in this
statute is meant to exempt from liability any claim that exists under the
common law. Hard to imagine Congress being clearer with regard to the
Savings Clause. "Nothing in this statute is meant preempt any common law
liability." Now when we talk about what's traditionally been a state function,
certainly tort liability, including products liability and negligence, has always
been left to the states. Congress has said it doesn't want this statute in any
way to preempt any of that. So you would think that a Court that's really
concerned about protecting state prerogatives would say no preemption, but
that's not what the Court says. Justice Breyer, writing for the five-person
majority, reads the Savings Clause very narrowly.
I must admit I found this part of Justice Breyer's opinion almost
incomprehensible, reading it over and over and trying to figure out why this
Express Clause is not sufficient. In essence, he said Congress wasn't
sufficiently specific. Congress didn't say that if the car manufacturer
I. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
complied with one of the safety mechanisms, it could still be sued for not
having another one. The problem with that interpretation is that the
Department of Transportation didn't promulgate the safety standards until a
year later. How could Congress have ever known to be that specific?
Let me use a second example here. It's the Crosby v. National Foreign
Trade Council2 that Dean Varat talked about so eloquently, especially at the
end of his remarks. Now the Supreme Court characterizes the state law here
as being inconsistent with federal statutes that impose sanctions on Burma.
I think there's another way to conceptualize what the state of Massachusetts
was doing here. The State of Massachusetts was deciding how it wanted to
spend state funds and taxpayer money. And the state here was saying "we
don't want to do business with companies that are doing business in Burma,
because we don't want any of our state money even indirectly going to support
this government that's committing human rights' violations." In this sense,
it wasn't Massachusetts imposing sanctions on the country of Burma. It
wasn't Massachusetts developing its own foreign policy. Massachusetts was
a state deciding where it wanted its money to go.
Many cities develop policies saying they didn't want to do business with
companies that were doing business in South Africa at the time of apartheid.
And I would say the same thing there, that was the prerogative of the city in
deciding how it wanted to spend its money-who it, as a government, wanted
to do business with. And yet, the Supreme Court didn't give deference to the
state here. Instead the Supreme Court, nine-to-nothing, found preemption.
So I find it very difficult to reconcile the preemption decisions of the Court
with the desire to protect state sovereignty and state prerogatives.
That leads me to my second point. Why the inconsistency on the
Supreme Court? I have a couple of thoughts here. One is there is an
over-arching consistency, in the sense that what the Supreme Court- is doing
in both areas, that reflects a Court that defers to no one. In response to a
question in the very first session, I said I think the dominant characteristic of
this Court is that it's a Court that doesn't defer to anyone. I think people
chuckled, but my hope is that having listened to the description of the cases
today, you see that illustrated over and again. It doesn't defer to Congress.
The Rehnquist Court declares federal laws unconstitutional at a much faster
rate than the Burger Court or the Warren Court. When you think of cases like
Morrison3 or Playboy Enterprises,4 the Court gave little deference to Congress
as a fact finder. It's not a Court that defers to federal agencies, see, for
example, Brown and Williamson v. FDA5 that Professor Kmiec talked about.
2. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
3. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
4. YoungBear v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 525 U.S. 1125 (2000).
5. Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
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It's not a court that defers to state courts and state legislatures. Think of Dale
v. Boy Scouts.6 I think here, with regard to state legislatures and the Crosby
case, and state courts and the Honda case, when you look at the Court's
decisions with regard to federal power or preemption, it's all about the
Supreme Court deciding with little deference.
I think there's another thing that explains the inconsistency-something
even more profound, and that's that the Supreme Court's federalism decisions
aren't really about protecting state government. Instead they're about a
conservative desire to limit federal power. Throughout American history,
conservatives have used federalism as an argument against exercises of
federal power. Federalism was used as an argument against abolition, as an
argument against reconstruction, as an argument against new-deal programs,
as an argument against desegregation. I don't think in these instances that
the real concern of the conservatives was protecting states as states. Though
the argument was presented in terms of states' rights, I think federalism
instead was an argument being advanced to try to achieve the substantive goal
of defeating exercises of federal power.
Think back to the Lochner' era and how the Supreme Court used
federalism there. If Congress tried to create minimum-wage law or child
labor law, it would be struck down on federalism grounds, and there would
be eloquent words from the Supreme Court about the need to limit federal
power to protect the states. But as states tried to adopt minimum-wage laws
or maximum-hour laws, they would then have their laws struck down on
grounds of substantive due process. So you have to wonder how much was
the Court really concerned about states' rights in those federalism cases, or
how much again was federalism just the mechanism the Court used to achieve
its conservative desire to limit government power. And I think that's what's
going on here with regard to the federalism cases. You have five Justices, the
majority of the Court, who very much want to limit federal power, limit the
scope of the commerce power, limit the scope of section 5 power, and revive
the Tenth Amendment, because of a traditional conservative concern about
federal power, but I don't think it's about a genuine concern about state
prerogatives.
Well, that leaves the third and final point I want to make. Is there an
alternative vision of federalism? Is there an alternative vision about the
proper relationships for doctrines concerning the scope of federal power and
preemption? And I would suggest there is. And that's to re-conceptualize
6. BoyScouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
7. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S 45 (1905).
federalism as being not about limits but instead as being about empowerment.
Traditionally, whenever we talked about federalism, we've always thought of
it as being about limits. During the Lochner era, again in the 1990's, and
today, we see federalism as limiting the scope of Congress's power. We're
talking here about federalism, in terms of preemption limiting state power.
But there is another conception of federalism-to see it as being about
empowering all levels of government to deal with social problems. This is
based on the Court's idea that the genius of having multiple levels of
government is having multiple levels to deal with social problems. That is,
if one level of government fails to deal effectively with social problems, then
we'll have another level of government to deal with it. Take the issue of
violence against women. If state governments are failing to effectively deal
with violence against women, then it's desirable to be a federal government
able to adopt a Violence Against Women Act to deal with the problem. Or
take car safety. It's desirable to have both federal safety standards and state
tort liability to maximize the possibility of safe cars so as to protect drivers
and passengers. In this sense, these regulations would be a very different
approach to both limits on federal power and preemption. From this
perspective, we shouldn't regard federalism as limiting federal power.
Instead, we should expand so we can find the scope of federal power.
I would prefer we have a very broad Commerce Clause. In this sense, I
disagree with both Professor Kmiec and Dean Sullivan. I think Congress'
findings that violence against women costs the American economy billions of
dollars a year is enough to show a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
At the same time, I think there should be a broad definition of Congress'
power under section 5 with spending authority as well. Correspondingly, I
believe there should be a very narrow preemption doctrine to empower state
and local governments to deal with social problems. And so I believe the
Court was wrong to find preemption in Geier and was wrong to find
preemption in Crosby. Now I'm attempting to, at this point, elaborate for you
my theory of federalism as empowerment rather than limits. I'm working on
a project in this regard, and it's tempting to share my thoughts, but it's really
late right now, everyone's really tired. I think what I'll simply say is to
consider it as an alternative way of dealing with the relationship between the
limits on federal power on one hand and preemption on the other. And all I'll
say is the program is titled "The Most Extraordinary Term." It's really been
a most extraordinary day. I just want to thank Professor Kmiec for including
me as part of this amazing day.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: David Pike of the Los Angeles Daily Journal has the final
question.
MR. PIKE: In view of the late hour, I'll just ask one quick question here. One of
the things I learned during the Crosby case was that California is the home
to all of these sanctions, resolutions, and ordinances. It seems like every city
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in California has one or maybe many, especially Northern California and Los
Angeles as well. Anyway, I'm just wondering if I could ask you to try the
crystal ball and come up with an ordinance that you think the Court would
approve of in terms of sanctions. I know you mentioned spending power as
opposed to regulatory power, but can you come up with one that you think the
Court would approve of?
DEAN VARAT: The predictive question is hard, and because it is getting close
to the dinner hour, I'm not interested in eating glass. But I will suggest one
that I think possibly could survive the Court's review. And of course, it
depends on what Congress does in response. I'm actually not quite willing
to gd as far as Professor Chemerinsky. I don't think it's a good idea to
actually sweep in other parties, and I wouldn't make distinctions between
divestment and investment, although I understand that in other areas we've
had decisions that distinguish between removing books from libraries and not
putting them in there in the first place, and one could draw distinctions like
that. But I wouldn't draw that distinction in this context. I would suggest
that divestment or investment of states' monies with the purpose, perfectly
fine in my view, of expressing some displeasure with the behavior of foreign
government ought to be able to survive as an exercise of state autonomy.
Let me just say one thing about that; there is a part of the decision in
Crosby where Justice Souter writes that the President's power really ought to
extend to the ability to have as a bargaining chip with foreign governments,
especially if we're doing multi-lateral negotiations, every aspect of the
national economy, without worrying about willy-nilly inconsistent political
tactics. That's very strong language that I think is too strong, frankly. I think
it completely denigrates the possibility that we could have local communities
as sites for community self-governance, if you will, even if they're just
making their own statements with their own money so that we can have some
competing notions of what ought to happen. I think that's frankly too much.
The notion of inconsistent political tactics seems to me hardly inconsistent
with federalism. We can go too far with the notion that the nation has to
speak with one voice, and that voice can never have any irritating notes of
discord along the way. Surely I don't think we're going to shut down the
ability of people to complain in the states about what the national government
is doing, and that's going to be irritating sometimes to foreign governments
as well. So there's some line drawing that has to be done, I think, in that
regard.
And when you talk about state pension funds, we are talking about
millions and millions, in fact, in some cases, even billions of dollars. There
probably could come a point where the impact is so large that, I suspect, I
might be inclined to allow some intervention. But if Congress hasn't acted,
I certainly wouldn't. If Congress has acted, I certainly would at least read
their intent quite narrowly.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: If I might just conclude. Erwin mentioned federalism and
its empowering capacity. Despite being cast by the local media in Los
Angeles in the role of point-counterpoint, Erwin and I, in this particular case,
are in entire agreement, and I think this perhaps typifies the effort that has
gone on here the entire day. What this discussion has been about has been the
search for constitutional principle, authentic and genuine principles of
interpretation, trying as much as we can to shed the political origins of our
ideas and our aspirations.
With regard to federalism in particular, I served in the Department of
Justice when the anti-apartheid provisions at the state and local government
level were being enacted, and the issue of their constitutionality fell to me for
evaluation. What position would the federal government take? As the head
of the office of legal counsel, I offered the opinion that basically said, "well,
if we're going to be consistent in our search for a federalist principle, we
should recognize the legitimacy of these state and local governments to make
their own independent spending decisions with regard to the money they're
spending." That is the position we took, much to the consternation of the
State Department, and even, I would say, the normal constituency that the
President would like to call upon as his own. And one of the things that I
think Dean Varat so very carefully outlined in the paper was this tension
between being consistent with regard to federalism as opposed to just merely
seeking a libertarian outcome that would be pro-business or pro-industry or
deregulatory, and that is one small example, but an important example, of
how it is important to keep principle separate from the political or partisan
objective.
There is a very special person in the room at the moment, and I want to
introduce him. When I first started teaching some twenty-five years ago, I
was wandering about the splendid Notre Dame library and came across the
proceedings of symposia that took place immediately after WWII, as people
desperately searched for a philosophy that might help the world regain its
bearings after its brutal confrontation with Stalin and Hitler. There, I saw the
original papers of Edward Corwin, the original papers of Roscoe Pound, the
original papers of Clarence Manion, and the original papers of Karl
Llewellyn, all of whom came to conferences at Notre Dame in the late 1940's
and 50's at that moment of recovery to address that question. And it planted
a seed in my mind that some day it would be wonderful to be among people
that intellectually tall and that great of purpose, in one room again. I thank
you for being here this afternoon. I think we did it one more time. And the
person who deserves every bit of that kind applause, is the person to whom
this symposium is dedicated, the seventh President of Pepperdine University,
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Andrew K. Benton.
MR. BENTON: I appreciate having just a few moments at the end of what I know
has been a stimulating day. I've heard bits and pieces of it, and I am so
honored. The University is honored by your presence today, and so I thank
you.
I begin with an admission against interest on this, my inaugural day. I
never set out to be a university president. That was never my plan. I did want
to go to law school, and I thought that some day that I would be a practicing
attorney and probably a judge in my home town. That's what I wanted to do,
and that was born largely from my experiences in the late '60s and early '70s
with all the civil unrest and the difficulty over Vietnam and conflict. And it
seemed to me that the judicial system brought order to what was sometimes
madness. Sometimes they contributed a little madness of their own, but by
and large, it was the judicial process that brought order to that madness. And
so I wanted to go to school, and I was appealed to by a great quote from
Daniel Webster that "[jiustice, sir, is the great interest of man on earth."' It
is a ligament which holds civilized beings and civilized nations together.
And that has always appealed to me, and I wanted to be involved in the
process by which my life would deal with ligaments.
However, I have now found myself in the business of higher education,
and I find myself surrounded by the esoterics of higher education, and I have
a hard time sometimes getting excited about the prosody of current studies of
metaphor in Mameluke poetry or the distinctions in inter-animations and
politics and rhetoric poetic split as embodied in the history and historiography
of nineteenth century composition and rhetoric. Or even believe it or not, I
have a hard time getting excited about studies in the erotic bird phenomenol-
ogy and literature.
Law does not have the luxury of research in a vacuum. Law breathes,
and it breathes in resolving the issues between state and federal rights, and it
breathes in the abortion nettle, and it breathes in the conflict and the struggle
in manners of school vouchers and school prayer policy. And I know you've
talked about those issues and many more today. And even our Supreme Court
does not have the privilege of remaining above the fray. But then, when was
a case or controversy regarding the Constitution a matter of mere esoterics?
Professor Kmiec mentioned Karl Llewellyn just a moment ago, and
before I started my own law studies many years ago, I read a book by Karl
8. Daniel Webster, OnMr. Justice Story (1845), in FAMIIAR QUOTATIONS, at 300 (John Bartlett ed.,
1Oth ed. 1919).
Llewellyn entitled The Bramble Bush,9 his lectures to first-year law students
at Columbia. And I recall the little poem in the beginning of that book.
'There was a man in our town and he was wondrous wise: he jumped into a
BRAMBLE BUSH and scratched out both his eyes-and when he saw that he
was blind, with all his might and main he jumped into another one and
scratched them in again."'" And I've always thought that was a fitting
description to describe the study of law with my own students. So I talk with
them about how lawyers and judges jump into the bramble bush, and just
when they think that all is lost, they find principles and precepts to lead
themselves out.
At Pepperdine University we are involved in our own tension between
ardently-held positions. We are an institution founded on faith by George
Pepperdine, who had very high ideals for us, and we struggle with that in
relation with our own high standards and wanting rigor in the law and in all
studies that are conducted here. And we hold both to high expectations, and
today that is a primary responsibility of mine.
Our founder, only 63 years ago charged us with preparing students for
lives of service, purpose, and usefulness, and for educating not only the heart,
but the mind, which is a broad and deep proposition. And in what can only
be described as presidential activism at Pepperdine University in recent years,
we have tried to move beyond that broad proposition and become not only
good, but really good if we can be. And so this symposium, the genius of
Doug Kmiec, his influence, and his persuasive abilities gives us what I believe
is a very, very fine day for this University, and so I thank you for that.
Let me return to the reason that I chose the law, not history, which is my
other love. I have a favorite scene from the movie Amistad. " Some of you
may remember lawyer Baldwin's reaction when he hears the story of how
Cinque fought a lion away from the village in which he lived. He looked at
Cinque and said, "You are a brave man," to which Cinque replied, "I'm not
a brave man. I'm a lucky man."' 2 I share this with you because the ligaments
in our society should not have to be brave or lucky to receive fairness or
justice. You, at a gathering like this and in the work that you do, help ensure
that. So, as I began, you honor us with your presence today afid your
participation. This is an uncommon gathering of scholars at an uncommon
time in this nation and at an uncommon time at this University as we prepare
for the future. I am simply here to say thank you.
9. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH iii (1981).
10. Id.
11. AMISTAD (Dream Works Pictures 1997).
12. Id.
